The Sino-Vietnamese war ( 中越战争 Zhōng-Yuè Zhànzhēng in Chinese) was fought between the
People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from February 17 to March 16,
1979. The PRC launched the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of
Cambodia and persecution of ethnic Chinese, which ended the reign of the PRC-backed
Map of Vietnamese-Chinese border, click to enlarge
Sino Vietnamese War documentary
In 1979, China invaded Vietnam. After very heavy fighting, the Chinese "opened the gates" to
Vietnam's capital Hanoi within a month and then withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese countryside
in ruins. The purpose of the conflict was to 1. Force Vietnam to cede the disputed land border
territories 2. demonstrate to Vietnam that the USSR will not militarily intervene against China and
honor their defense treaty 3.If possible, force Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia China failed
to force the Vietnamese to leave Cambodia, however after the war, the Chinese occupied the
disputed territories along the border. In 2000, these territories were officially given to China.
CBS news reports on rising tension between Vietnam
and China over Cambodia .
Origins of the Sino Vietnamese War, with background
on the Cambodian-Vietnamese War of 1975-77 .
Warning: graphic content
This well-researched volume examines the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of the late
1970s and 1980s, attempting to understand them as strategic, operational and tactical
events. The Sino-Vietnamese War was the third Indochina war, and contemporary Southeast
Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the Vietnamese fought
three, not two, wars to establish their current role in the region. The war was not about the
Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently claimed, but about China's support for its
Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, and the book addresses US and ASEAN involvement in
the effort to support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in
March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia at least
until 1988, but it was evident by 1984-85 that the PLA, held back by the drag of its 'Maoist'
organization, doctrine, equipment, and personnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion.
Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest to all students of the
Third Indochina War, Asian political history, Chinese security and strategic studies in general.
The Sino-Vietnamese war ( 中越战争in Chinese, in Vietnamese )
was fought between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from
February 17 to March 16, 1979. The PRC launched the offensive in response to Vietnam's
invasion and occupation of Cambodia and persecution of ethnic Chinese, which ended the reign
of the PRC-backed Khmer Rouge.
Vietnamese soldiers on a destroyed Chinese 8th Army tank
Pro-Vietnamese video on the war . Some Chinese soldiers called it a "painful, little war."
Vietnamese troops avoided battle and instead harassed PLA forces. Some Chinese officers
described it as a "ghost war," since the enemy troops were almost invisible, or a "shadow war,"
since it seemed they were fighting against their own shadows. The Vietnamese troops employed
the same tactics, made the same moves, and used the same weapons as the Chinese. They
knew exactly what the Chinese were trying to do. They exploited almost every problem and
weakness the Chinese had. The Chinese troops had to fight their own problems first before they
could fight the Vietnamese. Deng's border war taught the PLA a hard lesson....
Many of the PLA's commanding officers were shocked by the poor discipline, low morale,
combat ineffectiveness, and high casualties in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. During the
nineteen days of the first two phases, the PLA suffered 26,000 casualties, about 1,350 per day.
Gerald Segal points out that in Vietnam, "in contrast to Korea, Chinese troops performed
poorly. In Korea, they adequately defended North Korea, but in 1979 they failed to punish
Vietnam. China's Cambodian allies were relegated to a sideshow along the Thai frontier, and
China was unable to help them break out."During the war, 37,300 Vietnamese troops were
killed, and 2,300 were captured. The Soviet Union surprised the Vietnamese by refusing to get
involved in the conflict. On February 18, Moscow had denounced China's aggression and
promised that the Soviet Union would keep its commitments according to the Soviet-Vietnam
cooperation and friendship treaty. Then, however, the Soviet Union did not make any major
moves. Russian military intelligence did increase its reconnaissance planes and ships in the
South China Sea and along the Vietnamese coast after China's invasion. On February 24, two
Russian transport planes landed at Hanoi and unloaded some military equipment. Most
countries maintained a neutral position during the Sino-Vietnamese War.
The brief war was a grievous misfortune for both China and Vietnam, not only because it
resulted in material and human losses for both nations but also because it brought years of
earlier cooperation to a dispiriting conclusion. The war showed that American belief in the
domino theory was misplaced, since two Communist countries, one of which had just attained
national liberation, were now in conflict with each other. Each valued its own national interests
much more than the common Communist ideology. On February 27, 1979, Deng told American
journalists in Beijing that "Vietnam claims itself as the third military superpower in the world. We
are eliminating this myth. That's all we want, no other purpose. We don't want their territory. We
make them to understand that they can't do whatever they want to all the times."
Hanoi believed, however, that the Vietnamese army had taught the Chinese army a lesson. One
[People's Army of Vietnam] general said that China lost militarily and beat a hasty retreat: "After
we defeated them we gave them the red carpet to leave Vietnam." As Henry J. Kenny points out,
"Most Western writers agree that Vietnam had indeed outperformed the PLA on the
battlefield, but say that with the seizure of Lang Son, the PLA was poised to move into the
militarily more hospitable terrain of the Red River Delta, and thence to Hanoi." Kenny, however,
points out that Lang Son is less than twelve miles from the Chinese border but is twice that
distance from the delta. Moreover, at least five PAVN divisions remained poised for a
counterattack in the delta, and thirty thousand additional PAVN troops from Cambodia,
along with several regiments from Laos, were moving to their support. Thus the PLA would
have taken huge losses in any southward move toward Hanoi.
Although the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer Rouge had previously cooperated, the
relationship deteriorated when Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot came to power and established
Democratic Kampuchea. The Cambodian regime demanded that certain tracts of land be
"returned" to Cambodia, lands that had been "lost" centuries earlier. Unsurprisingly, the
Vietnamese refused the demands, and Pol Pot responded by massacring ethnic Vietnamese
inside Cambodia (see History of Cambodia), and, by 1978, supporting a Vietnamese guerrilla
army making incursions into western Vietnam.
"Wreaths at the Foot of the Mountain" (高山下的花环) is a 1984 Chinese film about the life of the
soldiers in a PLA army company before, during and after the Sino-Vietnamese War.
Clip from Chinese movie about Sino Vietnamese War
Realizing that Cambodia was being supported by the PRC, Vietnam approached the Soviets
about possible actions. The Soviets saw this as a major opportunity. The Vietnamese army, fresh
from combat with the US's ground forces, would easily be able to defeat the Cambodian forces.
This would not only remove the only major PRC-aligned political force in the area but also
demonstrate the benefits of being aligned with the USSR. The Vietnamese were equally excited
about the potential outcome. Laos was already a strong ally; if Cambodia could be "turned,"
Vietnam would emerge as a major regional power, political master of Indochina.
Video overview of the Sino Vietnamese War
The Vietnamese feared reprisals from the PRC. Over a period of several months in 1978, the
Soviets made it clear that they were supporting the Vietnamese against Cambodian incursions
. They felt this political show of force would keep the Chinese out of any sort of direct
confrontation, allowing the Vietnamese and Cambodians to fight out what was to some
extent a Sino-Soviet war by proxy.
In late 1978, the Vietnamese military invaded Cambodia. As expected, their experienced and
well-equipped troops had little difficulty defeating the Khmer Rouge forces. On January 7, 1979
Vietnamese-backed Cambodian forces seized Phnom Penh, thus ending the Khmer Rouge
Thus, according to the official Chinese view, the racially biased expulsion and persecution of
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam (Hoa) within Vietnam that began in the late 1970s was one of the
reasons. Persecution began when Vietnamese Chinese were stripped of their Vietnamese
citizenship as well as rights to own businesses and hold political positions of any kind. Within
the cities, large Chinese-owned businesses were seized by the Vietnamese government and
their goods confiscated overnight. Any remaining small businesses were subjected to additional
taxation not applicable to ethnic Vietnamese-owned business. The Vietnamese government's
rationale regarding these actions was to prevent disruption in services and goods in the
event that the ethnic Chinese population in Vietnam chose to sympathize with China if conflict
arose between the two countries. Vietnamese Chinese living near the China-Vietnam border
were simply forced back into Chinese territory.
The second and more official reason for the Chinese incursion into Vietnamese territory was
Vietnam's intrusion onto the Spratly Islands chain; claimed by China as her territory. Vietnamese
Navy vessels would move into the area, then fire at Chinese fishermen if they were found
operating in the area. Military establishments were also built in the face of official protest
by the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. These Vietnamese actions
were viewed by the Chinese Government as provocative and aggressive.
The third reason was the ongoing issue of the artillery harassment of frontier villages and
agricultural assets on the Chinese side by the Vietnamese army. Farmlands could not be
cultivated due to risk from explosions, created by Vietnamese artillery impacts. This affected the
local economy and decreased productivity. Subsequently, this led to dissent amongst the local
population regarding the Chinese government's inaction. As a result, this further raised
cross-border tensions and escalated the situation.
On February 15, 1979 the PRC publicly announced their intention to strike back at the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Few observers realized the symbolic importance of this
date. In an attempt to disrupt Vietnam, PRC snipers killed Vietnamese along the
Chinese-Vietnam border. It marked the expiration of the 30 year-old 1950 Sino-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and thus the first time that the PRC could strike back a
Soviet ally without breaking their own treaties. The reason cited for the counter strike was
the supposed mistreatment of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese minority and the Vietnamese
occupation of the Spratly Islands (claimed by the PRC).
Two days later, on February 17, a PRC force of about 85,000 supported by 200 tanks from the
PRC People's Liberation Army entered northern Vietnam. The Chinese force consisted of units
from the Kunming Military Region—later abolished—and the Guangzhou Military Region. Troops
from both military regions had been assigned to assist Vietnam in its struggle against the United
States just a few years earlier during the Vietnam War. Contrary to the belief that over 200,000
Chinese troops entered Vietnam, the actual number was only 85,000. However, 200,000 Chinese
troops were mobilized, of which 100,000 were deployed away from their original bases. Around
400 tanks were also deployed.
Chinese female fighters and entertaing the troops
The Chinese troop deployments were observed by US spy satellites, and the KH-9 Big Bird
photographic reconnaissance satellite played an important role. In his state visit to the US
in 1979, the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was presented with this information
and asked to confirm the numbers. He replied that the information was completely accurate.
After this public confirmation in the U.S., the domestic Chinese media were finally allowed to
report on these deployments.
Vietnamese soldiers with RPGs
Many of Vietnam's elite troops were in Cambodia keeping a tight grip on its newly occupied
territory. The Vietnamese government claimed they left only a force of about 70,000 including
several army regular divisions and divisions of the Public Security Army (the Vietnamese
equivalent of KGB border guards) in its northern area.
However, the Chinese encountered twice this number of Vietnamese forces as regular troops
were augmented by an additional large force of militias that outnumbered the regular force. This
concept of using local militias to fight the enemy has been a staple of Vietnamese defense
strategy since antiquity. The PLA managed to advance about forty kilometers into Vietnam, with
fighting mainly occurring in the provinces of Cao Bang, Lao Cai and Lang Son. On March 6, the
Chinese occupied the city of Lang Son. They claimed the gate to Hanoi was open, declared their
punitive mission achieved, and withdrew quickly. Their strategic aim of changing the situation in
Cambodia was not met.
Captured Chinese soldiers
To this day, both sides of the conflict describe themselves as the victor. The number of
casualties is disputed, with some Western sources claim PLA losses at more than 60,000
casualties, including about 26,000 killed
Captured Vietnamese soldiers
There were many reasons why it could be argued that the war was a disaster for the Chinese
armed forces. First, the Chinese military was using equipment and tactics from the era of
the Long March, World War II and the Korean war, which meant for example, that only Chinese
officers carried assault rifles, while the Vietnamese had more modern Soviet (and U.S.)
equipment, combined with assault rifles for every soldier.
Second, under Deng's order, China did not use their naval power and air force to suppress
enemy fire, neutralize strong points, and support their ground forces Therefore, the Chinese
ground forces were forced into absorbing the full impact of the Vietnamese forces' firepower.
Third, the PLA lacked adequate communications, transport, and logistics. Further, they were
burdened with an elaborate and archaic command structure which proved inefficient in the
FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area). Their maps were 75 years old. Runners were employed
to relay orders because there were few radios—those that they did have were not secure.
Fourth, China was one of the only two countries in the world at the time that lacked the
military rank system (the other being Albania), and thus commands were not effective.
Fifth, the Cultural Revolution had significantly weakened Chinese industry, and military hardware
produced suffered from poor quality, and thus did not perform well. Finally, the Chinese struck
back at an enemy that was highly trained, experienced, and confident due to successive victories
in wars with France, the U.S., and Cambodia.
The legacy of the war is lasting, especially in Vietnam. The Chinese implemented an effective
"scorched-earth policy" while retreating back to China. They caused extensive damage to the
Vietnamese countryside and infrastructure, through destruction of Vietnamese villages,
roads, and railroads.
Border skirmishes continued throughout the 1980s, including a significant skirmish in April of
1984; this saw the first use of the Type 81 Assault Rifle by the Chinese. In 1999, after many years
of negotiations, China and Vietnam signed a border pact, though the line of demarcation
remained secret.] There was a very slight adjustment of the land border at this time, resulting in
land being given back to China. Vietnam's official news service reported the actual
implementation of the new border around August 2001.
The Friendship Gate between
China and Vietnam
The war also resulted in the discrimination and consequent migration of Vietnam's
ethnic Chinese. Many of these people fled as "boat people" who eventually resettled
in Asian communities in Australia, Europe, North America, and back to China.
The Vietnamese government continuously requested an official apology from the Chinese
government for its invasion of Vietnam, but the Chinese government has never
apologized. After the normalization of relations between the two countries, Vietnam
officially dropped its demand for an apology.
A catalyst to improved relations between the two communist countries was the 1989
Tiananmen Square crackdown, at which point Vietnam showed strong support for the
Chinese measures, despite the fact that many Chinese officers who had served in the
Sino-Vietnamese War were active in suppressing the protest movement. Borders remained
The December 2007 announcement of a plan to build a Hanoi-Kunming highway was a landmark
in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The road will traverse the border that once served as a
battleground. It should contribute to demilitarizing the border region, as well as facilitating trade
and industrial cooperation between the nations.
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Sino Vietnamese War Links
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Four Lessons from the SinoVietnamese War
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